BRIAN J GRABER LLC is an employment discrimination lawyer representing employees in discrimination claims against their employers in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. On June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. __, 2025 WL 158264 (Jun. 5, 2025), holding that Title VII does not impose a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs in reverse discrimination claims filed against employers. This decision levels the playing field for majority group-plaintiffs claiming their employers committed reverse employment discrimination.

In Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. _, 2025 WL 158264 (Jun. 5, 2025), the defendant employer allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff, a heterosexual woman, based on sexual orientation when it promoted a lesbian woman for a management position and then demoted her and replaced her with a gay man. See Ames, 2025 WL 158264 at *2. The plaintiff claims the defendant violated Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of sexual orientation. Id. The District Court granted the employer summary judgment concluding that plaintiff had not shown “background circumstances” suggesting that the defendant employer was the rare employer who discriminated against members of the majority group. Id. The District Court held that plaintiffs who are members of majority groups – including heterosexual plaintiffs, like Ames – could not discharge their evidentiary burden at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. Id. The plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ames had failed to meet her prima facie case burden because she had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant was an unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Id. at *3. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.” Id. The Sixth Circuit ruled the defendant employer was entitled to summary judgment because Ames had failed to present evidence that the defendant was an unusual employer that discriminates against the majority. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split as to whether majority group plaintiffs are subject to a different evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs at the McDonnell Douglas’s first step.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Ames, held as follows:

The question in this case is whether, to satisfy that prima facie burden, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group must also show ‘background circumstances to support the suspicion that defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’ We hold that this additional ‘background circumstances’ requirement is not consistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the statute.
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2025 WL 1583264 at *2 (Jun. 5, 2025).

The Supreme Court held that the “background circumstances” created an unlawful heightened burden of proof for reverse discrimination plaintiffs. If you believe you have a reverse discrimination claim against your employer contact BRIAN J GRABER LLC for a free confidential consultation.

Most plaintiffs may satisfy the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework by presenting evidence “that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at *4. Under the Sixth Circuit’s precedent, plaintiffs who are members of a majority group bear an additional burden at step one: They must also establish “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Id. at *4. This creates a more heightened burden of proof for plaintiffs bringing reverse employment discrimination claims against employers. As to this “heightened burden of proof” the U.S. Supreme Court held it could not be squared with the text of Title VII as follows:

As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinction between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Rather, the provision makes it unlawful to ‘fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ The law’s focus on individuals rather than groups is anything but academic. By establishing the same protections for every ‘individual’ – without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group – Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2025 WL 1583264 at *4 (Jun. 5, 2025).

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the additional “heightened burden of proof” for plaintiffs in reverse discrimination claims is not supported by its longstanding precedents as follows:

Our case law thus makes clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not very based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. . . . The “background circumstances” rule also ignores our instruction to avoid inflexible applications of McDonnell Douglas’s first prong. . . . The ‘background circumstances’ rule disregards this admonition by uniformly subjecting all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case. As the Sixth Circuit observed, the rule effectively requires majority-group plaintiffs (and only majority-group plaintiffs) to produce certain types of evidence – such as statistical proof or information about the relevant decision-maker’s protected traits – that would not otherwise be required to make out a prima facie case. This Court has Lon rejected such ‘inflexible formulations’ of the prima facie standard in disparate-treatment cases. We do so again today.
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2025 WL 1583264 at *4-5 (Jun. 5, 2025).

The U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs and vacated the and remanded the case for application of the proper prima facie standard. Id. at *6. At this point, plaintiffs bringing reverse employment discrimination claims against their employers are now held to the same standards of proof utilized in the vast majority of Title VII employment discrimination claims.

If you believe you were suffered reverse discrimination, contact BRIAN J GRABER LLC, is an employment discrimination lawyer representing employees in Illinois, Indian, and Michigan for a free confidential consultation. Learn more about your right to be free from employment discrimination under federal law here. Learn more about your rights to be free from employment discrimination under Illinois law here. Learn more about your right to be free from employment discrimination in Indiana here. Learn more about your right to be free from employment discrimination in Michigan here.

Justice Thomas with Justice Gorsuch Concurring Opinion Raises Significant Questions About the Future Of The Standard for Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Claims.

Justice Thomas wrote separately to highlight the problems that arise when judges create textual legal rules and frameworks. Id. at *6. Judge-made doctrines have a tendency to distort the underlying statutory text, impose unnecessary burdens on litigants, and cause confusion for courts. Id. The “background circumstances” rule – correctly rejected by the Court today – is an example of this phenomenon. Id. Justice Thomas calls into question the future of the McDonnell Douglas framework is a suitable tool for evaluating Title VII claims at summary judgment stating as follows:

In my view, the framework is incompatible with the summary-judgment standard; it fails to encompass the various ways in which a plaintiff could prove his claim; it requires courts to maintain artificial distinctions between direct and circumstantial evidence; and it has created outsized judicial confusion.
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2025 WL 1583264 at *12 (Jun. 5, 2025) (Thomas, J., concurring).

It appears the U.S. Supreme Court may consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is an appropriate tool for evaluating Title VII claims on summary judgment as follows:

This case did not present the question whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is an appropriate tool for evaluating Title VII claims at summary judgment. In a case where the issue is squarely before us, I would consider whether the framework should be used for that purpose. in the meantime, litigants and lower courts are free to proceed with the McDonnell Douglas framework. This Court has never required anyone to use it. And, district courts are well equipped to resolve summary judgment motions without it. Every day – and in almost every context except the Title VII context – district courts across the country resolve summary judgment motions by applying the straightforward text of Rule 56. In my view, it might behoove courts and litigants to take that same approach in Title VII cases.
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2025 WL 1583264 at *12 (Jun. 5, 2025) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Based on these statutes it is possible that the Supreme Court may examine whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is an appropriate tool for evaluating Title VII claims at summary judgment stage if the issue is squarely before the Court.

U.S. Supreme Court Rules Title VII Does Not Require A Heightened Standard in Reverse Discrimination Claims.

Justice Thomas with Justice Gorsuch Concurring Opinion Raises Significant Questions About the Future Of The Standard for Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Claims.

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